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With the nomination of the 
European Union in 2012, the 
Nobel Peace Prize Commission 
celebrated one of the strangest 
anomalies in Western history: the 
absence of wide-scale bloodshed 
in Europe for more than 60 years.  
The Commission attributed this 
success to a European Union in 
the throes of economic malaise.  
However, particular praise was 
reserved specifically for the 
nations of France and Germany 
and their mutual relationship of 
support, cooperation and 
leadership.  Friendship between 
France and Germany (another 
remarkable anomaly in the history 
of Europe), which was one of the 
primary factors behind the 
European recovery after World 
War II, has begun, ever so slightly, 
to change in the face of a stagnant 
and far less impressive economic 
recovery from the most recent 
global financial crisis. 
The new strain on Franco-
German relations, and the new 
threat to European economic 
stability, is becoming particularly 
apparent under the presidency of 
François Hollande, France’s 
current Socialist executive.  As a 
result of German interests in 
implementing Europe-wide 
austerity policies, and the weak 
and seemingly ineffective centrist 
leadership under Hollande, 
significant changes seem almost 
inevitable.  Specifically, it will be a 
turn for the worse, one away from 
the center in France’s domestic 
politics toward the extremities of 
the political spectrum and changes 
in France’s relationship with 
Germany that will make for a 
significantly weaker European 
Union. 
The relationship between 
Western Europe’s two most 
powerful nations has historically 
been characterized by mutual 
dislike and rivalry in economic, 
military and territorial matters. In 
January of 1871, Paris was finally 
relieved from an unusually savage 
Prussian siege.  That year, the 
humiliating end of the Franco-
Prussian War and the German 
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine — 
the contentious, German-speaking 
strip of land located on the French 
side of the Rhine — only 
exacerbated mutual dislike.  
Moreover, the strong French 
desire to establish a “natural” 
border with Germany on the Rhine 
inspired a strong French irredentist 
movement for the recovery of lost 
territory and glory.  Over the next 
three-quarters of a century, 
Franco-German antipathy 
continued to fester, spanning two 
World Wars and costing the lives 
of millions. 
France and Germany have 
been the two preeminent powers, 
first militarily and then 
economically, of continental 
Western Europe since the 
unification of Germany in 1871.  
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The two twin powers regarded 
conflict as so inevitable, in fact, 
that they created a system of 
alliances reaching from London to 
Rome to Moscow based entirely 
on mutual defense against each 
other.  Animosity toward Germany 
was so powerful at the turn of the 
last century that it managed to 
bring France together with its 
perpetual rival, Great Britain.  The 
national feeling among the French 
toward German control of Alsace-
Lorraine was rife with hatred and 
revanchist sentiment.  French 
politician Léon Gambetta’s famous 
statement about German-
controlled Alsace-Lorraine, “Never 
speak of them; never forget them,” 
couldn’t have been inspired by a 
mere desire for territory.1  This 
was the mark of a definite cultural 
hatred and thus imbued the policy 
of both France and Germany from 
1871 to the end of World War II in 
1945 and beyond. 
It wasn’t until five years 
after the end of their most recent 
and bloodiest conflict that France 
and Germany began moving 
toward the friendship that’s such a 
foundational part of European 
stability today.  In May 1950, the 
French foreign minister approved 
a treaty founding the European 
Coal and Steel Community in an 
attempt to make the Franco-
German conflict “not merely 
unthinkable, but materially 
impossible.”2 The two nations were 
also founding members and 
fundamental supporters of the new 
European Community, an 
organization that would eventually 
become one of the most important 
forerunners to the European 
Union.  In 1963, with the signing of 
the Élysée Treaty, the two nations 
began working toward a more-or-
less joint foreign policy, economic 
and military cohesion and youth 
exchanges.  Then-Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer portentously 
declared on the occasion, “The 
methods may change, but…we 
may never lose the trust of 
friends.”3  For better or worse, 
these two perpetual rivals had 
thrown their two fortunes in 
together. 
These two nations that had 
been fundamentally opposed to 
each other for hundreds of years 
went from rivals in World War to 
the closest allies in Europe in a 
matter of a decade, caused by a 
marriage of political necessity in 
the polarized power play between 
the United States and the USSR.  
Former French president Nicolas 
Sarkozy, declaring that Franco-
German reconciliation and 
friendship was inevitable, said that 
the alliance was essentially 
apolitical within France and that he 
“would even go so far as saying it 
is an existential issue.”4  Moreover, 
the France-Germany alliance 
hasn’t been undisturbed by 
disagreement in the past.  Most 
notably and most fundamentally, 
France has historically preferred a 
“Europe des patries” or “Europe of 
homelands,” as Charles de Gaulle 
said it, whereas Germany has 
generally backed closer union 
within the EU in order to avoid that 
which Otto von Bismarck called “a 
nightmare of coalitions” directed 
against itself.5 6  Nevertheless, 
there’s at least a correlation 
between Franco-German unity and 
political stability in Western 
Europe, and it’s obvious that the 
two nations’ codependence has 
only grown more extensive since 
they first combined their fortunes. 
Beyond the geopolitical 
necessities of friendship, beyond 
the 320,000 French employed by 
German companies and the 
285,000 Germans employed by 
French, beyond whatever mutual 
cultural admiration is celebrated in 
every meeting between their 
heads of state, there remains the 
singular fact that France and 
Germany, the two largest 
economies within the Eurozone, 
use the same currency.7  This is 
the strongest and best rationale for 
Germany’s involvement in Europe 
and France’s recent and ongoing 
economic malaise and one of the 
foremost factors in Hollande’s 
government’s increasing 
deference to what his opponents 
call “the agenda of the German 
right.”8 
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No such accusations of 
defection to the right would have 
been made by anyone less than 
intimately familiar with Hollande’s 
résumé a few years ago, when 
Hollande campaigned for and won 
the French presidency with 51.6 
percent of the vote.  Filling his 
campaign speeches with bombast 
such as declaring that his “enemy 
is the world of finance” and that he 
“dislikes the rich,” Hollande 
presented himself to the 2012 
French electorate as the 
conventional French Socialist 
candidate — that is to say, 
intensely anti-business in 
economic policy. 9 10  Who could 
forget his broken promise of taking 
75 percent taxes from the highest 
tax bracket?11 Although Hollande 
has generally been pro-
Europeanization and in favor of 
strengthened ties with Germany, 
his appointment of Jean-Marc 
Ayrault, the “virtually unknown” 
rank-and-file Socialist former 
mayor of Nantes, as his first prime 
minister signified little more than 
conventional Socialism in 
Hollande’s formative 
government.12 
Nevertheless, even during 
Hollande’s honeymoon phase, 
there were still hecklers on his 
own side of the aisle who could 
recognize a pragmatist when they 
saw one.  Dubbed by some leftist 
malcontents as a follower of a 
“socialism of adjustment,” there’s 
no doubt that Hollande places 
political viability over ideology.  
Only when it was beneficial to take 
a hard line against many of the 
issues French Socialists align 
themselves against, Hollande put 
himself on the winning side.  
Reminiscent of Bill Clinton in 1992, 
Hollande says that he wants to 
make the Socialists a “party of 
government” rather than of ideas, 
an electable institution rather than 
a dogmatic political club. 13 
Thus, Hollande, ever the 
political realist, acted only naturally 
in the major changes he began to 
phase into French policy and 
government staffing in early 2014.  
Defending what skeptical leftists 
called a U-turn in policy, Hollande 
attempted to explain away 
unpopular changes in budgetary 
policy such as a €50 billion cut in 
spending and a lowering of the 
budget deficit to levels below the 
German-dictated EU standard by 
2017.  He called this an 
“acceleration” of policies already in 
place.  As a politically pragmatic 
policy was already in place, 
Hollande has technically stayed 
true to his political philosophy by 
merely responding to changes in 
political necessity, from pleasing 
French voters to pleasing French 
business leaders and, more 
importantly, to pleasing Berlin. 14 
This facile dodging of the 
accusation that he has been 
inconsistent, however, doesn’t 
manage to explain the several 
very real changes Hollande 
affected in his government in 
2014.  First and foremost is the 
replacement of Ayrault as prime 
Beyond the geopolitical necessities of 
friendship, beyond the 320,000 French 
employed by German companies and the 
285,000 Germans employed by French, 
beyond whatever mutual cultural 
admiration is celebrated in every meeting 
between their heads of state, there 
remains the singular fact that France and 
Germany, the two largest economies 
within the Eurozone, use the same 
currency. 
10 
minister with a young disciple of 
Tony Blair from the south of 
France named Manuel Valls.  Prior 
to his installation as prime minister 
in April 2014, Valls made French 
headlines for committing unusual 
acts, like unsuccessfully 
suggesting the word “Socialist” be 
dropped from his party’s name in 
favor of something sounding more 
modern.15  Since entering office, 
he has been as unorthodox as to 
suggest an easing of the 35-hour 
legal limit on the French work 
week and to declare at a major 
employers’ convention: “France 
needs you…I love business!”16  
Another new member of 
Hollande’s cabinet, Minister of 
Economy Emmanuel Macron, is 
undoubtedly even more 
controversial with the stalwart 
leftists of the Socialist Party.  
Macron, a former investment 
banker, once referred to 
Hollande’s 75 percent tax plan as 
“Cuba without the sun,” and is 
committed to centrist reform to the 
point that he has said, even “if 
[Hollande and Valls] decide not to 
deliver, I will move.” 17 18 
To look at Hollande’s 
political opponents at home, it 
would seem at first that the topic of 
the French-German alliance is 
indeed apolitical: Members of both 
the far left and the far right 
increasingly oppose it.  On the far 
right, Marine le Pen, chairman of 
the National Front, has recently 
been more and more outspoken in 
her criticisms of France’s leading 
foreign investor and partner in 
trade.19  In June 2014, Le Pen 
“shocked” the German press when 
she told them that German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel “thinks 
she can conduct politics contrary 
to the will of the people,” and that 
the “strong euro” that German 
policy is currently pursuing will 
“ruin” France. 20   Moreover, 
according to Le Pen, Germany has 
created an “antidemocratic 
monster” in the present European 
Union. 21  Taking more of a 
nationalistic than a patriotic stand, 
Le Pen warned, “Germany should 
never forget that France is the 
heart” of the European Union.22 
Her threat was made all the more 
ominous by the historic gains her 
decidedly Eurosceptic party made 
in May’s elections to France’s 
seats in the European Parliament 
— a full 25 percent of the vote 
went to the National Front.23 
Equally as belligerent 
against Hollande’s regime and its 
policies supposedly beholden to 
German control is Hollande’s own 
recently ousted minister of 
economy, a noted supporter of 
“de-globalization” and a new, less 
Europeanized French Constitution, 
Arnaud Montebourg and his “new 
Socialists.” 24  He calls Germany 
the new “sick man of Europe” and 
suggests that, following the 
reunification of East and West 
Germany, France’s foremost ally 
has returned to “improbable 
dreams…of continental 
dominance.”25 The admittedly 
dramatic leftist accused Berlin of 
setting “a trap of austerity that it 
has imposed all over Europe,” and 
stated that it was France’s 
responsibility to “heighten the 
tone” of Franco-German 
relations.26  Moreover, a growing 
sentiment in the far left places the 
blame for its party’s gradual 
liberalization on meddlesome 
German influence.  Shortly after 
the dismissal of Montebourg and 
his followers, an editor in Le 
Figaro asked whether Valls was 
not merely “the representative of a 
foreign party” and whether “those 
who openly doubt the economic 
policy of Berlin” have anywhere 
“left to hide.”27 
Reminiscent of Bill 
Clinton in 1992, 
Hollande says that 
he wants to make 
the Socialists a 
“party of 
government” rather 
than of ideas, an 
electable institution 




Although what was said in 
Le Figaro is probably true on the 
inside of the official Socialist Party, 
it’s not at all the case outside of it.  
Despite having been ejected in 
disgrace from the cabinet, 
Montebourg and his ultra-socialist 
doctrines possess enough support 
among French voters that he’s 
already considered a prime 
contender for the Socialist 
nomination in 2017 and possibly 
the presidency itself.  Moreover, 
Hollande’s historically low 13 
percent approval rating is the 
lowest rating of any president 
since the founding of the French 
Fifth Republic in 1958.  This 
suggests that the centrist policies 
that Hollande has recently been 
pursuing are preferred less and 
less by left-leaning voters.  
Increasingly, more French voters, 
disillusioned by the apparent 
ineffectiveness of Hollande’s 
realistic leftism, are moving to the 
political extremes. 
Far more widespread, 
however, than further 
radicalization of the French left 
wing — already one of the most 
dogmatic in Europe — is an 
unprecedented shift to the right in 
voters’ preference.  Cornerstones 
of classic French Socialist policy, 
such as the obligatory 35-hour 
limit to the workweek, are 
becoming less popular, with 61 
percent of the public saying the 
limit should be eased. Fifty-six 
percent even agreed that public 
spending should be cut.28  Even 
more strikingly, a poll conducted 
by Le Figaro in early September 
2014 showed that Marine le Pen 
was the favorite in every first-
round presidential election for 
2017, winning outright in the 
second round when pitted against 
Hollande.29  Unfortunately for 
Hollande, what’s recognized as a 
shift to the center by the left isn’t 
as appreciated by those on the 
right.  Jean-François Copé, leader 
of former president Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s center-right Union for a 
Popular Movement, decried 
Hollande in the wake of his 
change in policy trajectory in 
January 2014 as “ever François 
Hollande…vague, full of hot air 
and remnants of old Socialist 
doctrine.”30  Thus, even as 
Hollande’s government moves to 
more centrist positions, elements 
of the right grow further and further 
from the center, while the center-
right follows in growing less 
moderate. 
What Hollande’s domestic 
political woes mean for 
international relations and the 
European Union is primarily rooted 
in the increasingly common 
association of his policies with 
German economic intervention.  In 
fact, much of Hollande’s 
maneuvers are only made 
necessary because of Berlin’s 
wide-reaching political-economic 
influence in the European Union.  
In exchange for Hollande’s move 
to make it easier for France to 
borrow from the European Central 
Bank, for instance, Merkel wants 
considerably more direct influence 
in the French government’s 
policies regarding taxation.31  Part 
of the reasoning behind Hollande’s 
attempts to cut the government’s 
annual deficits to three percent by 
2017 is the hope that Germany will 
be more willing to relax EU 
regulations and give France 
access to a €6 billion earmark now 
sitting in EU coffers.32  Regardless 
Regardless of how unhappy Hollande and 
French citizens are with complying with 
German demands for increased austerity, 
their tendency to bend to German 
demands can be the only possible result 
of France’s economic dependence on 
German goodwill, at the very least until 
the end of Hollande’s term in 2017. 
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of how unhappy Hollande and 
French citizens are with complying 
with German demands for 
increased austerity, their tendency 
to bend to German demands can 
be the only possible result of 
France’s economic dependence 
on German goodwill, at the very 
least until the end of Hollande’s 
term in 2017. 
The impact of Le Pen’s 
present popularity and 
Montebourg’s present challenge 
on Franco-German friendship are 
yet to be seen.  It’s possible, as 
has been the case several times in 
the history of the Fifth Republic, 
that French voters are giving their 
allegiance to the National Front 
only temporarily as a protest 
against the current Socialist 
government.  Perhaps Montebourg 
and his followers will eventually 
submit to a more neoliberal 
version of their party.  However, 
even if both of these individuals 
end up with little power 
themselves, it should be 
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